On September 15, 1944, the United States invaded the tiny Pacific island of Peleliu, located at the southern end of the Palau Islands. Boasting a large airfield from which the Americans could mount bomber campaigns, Peleliu was a strategically essential part of Gen. MacArthur's long-awaited liberation of the Philippines. With the famed 1st Marine Division making the amphibious assault, Pacific High Command was confident that victory would be theirs in just a few days.

They were drastically wrong. A mere week after landing, having sustained terrific losses in fierce combat, the 1st Marine Regiment was withdrawn. The entire division would be out of action for six months after sustaining the highest unit losses in Marine Corps history.

This book analyzes the many things that went wrong in the Battle for Peleliu, and in doing so, corrects several earlier accounts of the campaign. It includes a comprehensive account of the presidential summit that determined the operation, details of how new weapons were deployed, a new enemy strategy, and command failure in what became the most controversial amphibious operation in the Pacific during WWII.