Rainer Enskat: Die Form der Dialektik in Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes
Abstract:
In his Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel has – in comparison with the enormous
complexity of the whole work – in a somewhat hidden way hinted at the formal nucleus of what
he conceives of as dialectic, especially as the dialectical movement. This movement has the form
of a sceptical examination, testing the claims of the consciousness to be in the possession of
knowledge. Such a claim is bound, as Hegel shows, to many different cognitive levels of the
consciousness – beginnig with sensual certainty and ending with absolute knowledge. The way
of the examination corresponds exactly to the levels of the consciousness. But on its way to the
absolute knowledge the examination encounters, appropriate to its sceptical intention, as many
non-veracious forms of knowledge as are different from absolute knowledge. Each sceptical test
which encounters a non-veracious form of knowledge presents necessarily the nothingness of
what it is the result, a result which contains what the foregoing non-veracious forms of
knowledge save anyhowas true. In the following article it is to show that this nucleus of the form
of the dialectical movement stands the test ifapplied to the step resp. jump from sensual certainty
to perception. If the following interpretationsand analysesare founded well enough it is justified
to be confident that interpretations and analyses of further 'experiences of consciousness' on the
same line can be fruitful.
Bernardo Ferro: How Platonic is Hegel's Dialectic? A new approach to an old debate
Abstract:
While in recent years the link between Hegel and Aristotle has been widely
explored, Hegel's Platonic heritage seems to have faded into the background. This asymmetry is
partly due to the standard characterization of Plato as a dogmatic metaphysician, committed to a
"two-world" ontology. In this paper, I show that Hegel's engagement with Plato stands out
precisely for his rejection of this kind of reading and, moreover, that this attitude sheds an
important light on his own thought. To determine how, I focus on Plato's and Hegel's conceptions
of dialectics. I argue that both models, despite their obvious differences, share key
structural similarities, which can only be truly appreciated by moving beyond mainstream Platonism.
This change of perspective allows for a clearer understanding of Hegel's philosophical
development and for new insights into his philosophy as a whole.
Anton Friedrich Koch: Hegel's Parmenidean Descent to the Science Without Contrary
Abstract:
This essay is intended to make Hegel's Science of Logic intelligible from its basic antidogmatic
methodological rule and resolve: "to want to think purely", i. e. without presuppositions.
The beginning of the Logic (with Being, Nothing, Becoming, Being-there) is deduced from this
resolve in detail, as is the central logical operation of negation, especially in application to itself,
i. e. non-well-founded or circular negation. Various forms of negation in the logic of being and
the three basic types of circular negation that are operative in the logic of being, essence and
concept respectively are distinguished and all findings are related to Hegel's text. The discussion
takes place within the framework of classical metaphysics and logic (Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz) and
contemporary analytic metaphysics. In particular, Michael Della Rocca's radically monistic
Parmenidean Ascent (2020) to Being is discussed as a profiling foil against which Hegel's
Parmenidean descent from Being to negation, becoming and to all sorts of distinctions stands out. A
second foil for comparison is the "science without contrary" that Sebastian Rödl presented in
Self-Consciousness and Objectivity (2018). It turns out that Hegel is much more considerate of the
radical sceptic than Rödl.
