Using a pan-European data set of 8.5 million firms, this paper finds that firms with high debt overhang invest relatively more than otherwise similar firms if they are operating in sectors facing good global growth opportunities. At the same time, the positive impact of a marginal increase in debt on investment efficiency disappears if firm debt is already excessive, if it is dominated by short maturities, and during systemic banking crises. The results are consistent with theories of the disciplining role of debt, as well as with models highlighting the negative link between agency problems at firms and banks and investment efficiency.
EIB Working Papers 2019/01 - Blockchain, FinTechs : and their relevance for international financial institutions
bookEIB Working Papers 2019/03 - Financing and obstacles for high growth enterprises: the European case
bookEIB Working Papers 2019/04 - Can survey-based information help to assess investment gaps in the EU?
bookEIB Working Papers 2018/06 - Resource Misallocation in European Firms : The Role of Constraints, Firm Characteristics and Managerial Decisions
bookEIB Working Papers 2018/07 - Young SMEs: Driving Innovation in Europe?
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